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ABSTRACT 
The majority of African farmers lack the means to mitigate the impact of risks such as those associated 
with rainfall and commodity prices. Because most farmers in Sub-Saharan Africa are risk-averse, they 
may be willing to invest in productive assets that can mitigate the impacts of such risks if their capital 
constraints are relaxed through external financial assistance. We test this hypothesis using panel data on 
Nigerian farmers’ investment behaviors collected during the Second National Fadama Development 
Program (Fadama II), which provided financial assistance to farmers in obtaining various productive 
assets, as well as historical data on rainfall and white gari price in various locations in Nigeria. The 
results support the hypothesis. Under the Fadama II, farmers facing higher rainfall risk (coefficient of 
variation in annual rainfall) were more likely to invest in irrigation pumps that can mitigate the impact of 
rainfall risk, and those facing higher risks on white gari price were more likely to invest in milling 
machines that enable them to process cassava into flour instead of gari. 
Keywords:  poverty trap, rainfall risk, price risk, irrigation pump, milling machine, risk aversion 
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1.  BACKGROUND AND RESEARCH QUESTION 
The majority of farmers in Nigeria, as in the rest of Sub-Sahara Africa, are vulnerable to various types of 
market-related and climatic risks. Although farmers mobilize various resources to partly insure 
themselves against such risks, they are often resource poor and lack the capacity for sufficient insurance. 
Productive assets may play dual roles in an environment susceptible to risks. They not only increase the 
productivity or profitability, but they also potentially shield farmers from certain risks. For example, an 
irrigation pump allows farmers to overcome erratic rainfall and a milling machine allows them to sell 
processed cassava (such as cassava flour) instead of cassava tuber or gari (other popular cassava products 
processed without using a milling machine).
1
Public support programs have been implemented in a variety of forms to help farmers invest in 
productive assets that can partly mitigate their risks. In Nigeria, the Second Fadama Development 
Program (Fadama II) was implemented from 2004 through 2006, leading to new, large-scale investment 
by farmers in many productive assets, including irrigation pumps and milling machines (Nkonya et al. 
2008). How farmers benefit from public support programs like Fadama II depends not only on how 
liquidity-constrained the beneficiary farmers are or how much return the investment in productive assets 
brings on average, but also how such investments can mitigate the risks the farmers face. The impacts of 
these programs are often evaluated by subsequent changes in farmers’ incomes. The evaluation of actual 
benefits of such programs, however, may also need to consider how they improve farmers’ capacity by 
mitigating the effects of risks they are exposed to. Though the evaluation of actual benefits from such 
improvement in risk-coping capacity is not straightforward, we can gain useful insights from whether the 
farmers’ investment decisions under programs like Fadama II depend on the level of the risks they are 
exposed to. 
 Risk-averse farmers in developing countries like Nigeria 
may be more willing to invest in such productive assets if external financial support is available. Farmers 
facing higher variation in rainfall may be more willing to invest in irrigation pumps. Farmers observing 
more variation in gari price may be more willing to invest in milling machines to start processing cassava 
into flour instead of gari. 
This paper empirically examines whether farmers’ investments in irrigation pumps and milling 
machines during the Fadama II program were affected by climatic and market risks. More specifically, 
this paper examines whether farmers were more likely to invest in irrigation pumps and milling machines 
under Fadama II if they were located in the regions with higher variations in annual rainfall and white 
gari price. Both the linear probability model (LPM) in two-stage least squares (2SLS) specification and 
stratified propensity score matching (PSM) method are used to correct the potential self-selection by 
farmers to participate in the Fadama II program. Our results support the hypothese that higher rainfall risk 
led to more investment in irrigation pumps, and higher white gari price risk led to more investment in 
milling machines. 
This paper also provides evidence that potential benefits from public interventions aiming to 
support their acquisition of productive assets depend on the risks farmers are facing, and potentially on 
the incompleteness of markets such as missing insurance market. Precautionary or buffer stock motives in 
asset accumulation is well known in the context of developing countries where the market system does 
not provide means to insure against a variety of risks. Credit market is often imperfect too. The results in 
this paper indicate that public programs like Fadama II can potentially help farmers to overcome such 
market failures.  
                                                       
1 In Nigeria, cassava is processed into various products, including gari (a granular product) and flour. Although gari is 
sometimes called “fermented cassava flour” (Onweluzo and Eilittä 2003) and cassava flour is sometimes called “unfermented 
cassava flour,” gari and unfermented cassava flour are made in quite different ways, including the use or nonuse of a milling 
machine. While a milling machine is used to make unfermented cassava flour from dried cassava chips, it is not used to make 
gari from cassava in Nigeria (Taiwo 2006). 
Unfermented cassava flour is therefore a substitute product for gari for cassava producers in Nigeria. A higher price risk for 
gari is therefore expected to make farmers invest in milling machines to process cassava into unfermented flour instead of gari as 
a safer option. 2 
In addition, by analyzing how farmers’ investment responds to the relaxation of liquidity 
constraints, we have deeper insights about broader issues of poverty traps. The fact that farmers invest in 
productive assets based on risk mitigation rather than maximization of expected profit is an indication of 
potential poverty traps wherein poor farmers remain poor due to their lack of sufficient risk management 
capacity (Barrett and Carter 2006).  
The paper is organized as follows: The next section lays out our conceptual framework and 
describes key hypotheses. Section 3 discusses empirical strategy. We use instrumental variable and 
propensity score matching estimation. Data and policy intervention used in our analysis are described in 
Section 4. Section 5 reports our empirical results. Section 6 concludes. 
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2.  CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Utility maximization problem for a farmer can be expressed as the following: 
    (1) 
subject to 
  (2) 
    (3) 
  (4) 
qkt – xkt + Akt – skt – ckt ≥ 0   for all k = 1 … k; t = 0, …, ∞  (5) 
G(qt, xt, Pt, Mt, rt; ψt) = 0  for all k = 1 … k; t = 0, ..., ∞  (6) 
rt ~ i.i.d (μr, σr) for all t = 0, ..., ∞, with the level of risk measured as θr = σr / μr  (7) 
πgt ~ i.i.d (μg, σg) for all t = 0, ..., ∞, with the level of risk measured as θg = σg / μg  (8) 
ckt, qkt, xkt ≥ 0  for all k = 1 … k; t = 0, ..., ∞,  (9) 
in which farmer’s utility is a function of consumption of goods k at t (ckt) and other factors zt summed 
across all the period from t = 0 to t = ∞ with discount factor δ. At t, a farmer chooses whether to invest in 
an irrigation pump (Pt  = 1 if yes, 0 otherwise) and a milling machine (Mt  = 1 if yes, 0 otherwise) and ckt 
to maximize his utility. The budget constraint (2) states that, at each period t, the sum of net revenue 
minus net sale of cassava flour (sft) times cassava flour price (πft), net revenue for gari (πgt sgt), cassava 
tuber (πctsct), and the sum of net revenue for all the other commodities (Πt'St in which Πt and St are a 
vector of other commodities prices and net sales, respectively), income from all other sources (Tt), and 
non-productive liquid assets at the beginning of period (Wt) must cover the cost farmers actually pay for 
the irrigation pump, milling machine, and other productive assets. The cost farmers actually pay for 
productive asset n (irrigation pump and milling machine are denoted p and m, respectively) that is the true 
price of asset wnt minus the portion covered by Fadama II financial assistance (subsidy of 100∙fn%) if the 
farmer is a Fadama II member (F = 1 if member, 0 if not) and if the farmer buys that asset (Nt = 1 if they 
buy, 0 if not). Therefore, in the instance of an irrigation pump, farmers pay wpt (1– F ∙ fp) while the 
remaining wpt F ∙ fp is covered by the Fadama II financial assistance. For each farmer, the amount of total 
∑
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assistance from the Fadama II program is fixed at level f*(constraint (3).
2
Equation (5) states that, at each t, the consumption of goods k (ckt) cannot be greater than the sum 
of production (qkt) and the initial endowment of k (Akt) net the quantity used as inputs (xkt) and net sales. 
Equation (6) states that the production of goods k (qkt) is determined by the production technology defined 
in G(∙), which states the relationship between production; input quantity; whether the farmer has an 
irrigation pump, milling machine, both, or neither; other determinants (ψt); and the rainfall level (rt). The 
rainfall is assumed to fluctuate randomly around its mean (μr) with standard deviation (σr) (Equation (7)). 
Similarly, the price of cassava gari (πgt) is assumed to fluctuate randomly around its mean (μg) with 
standard deviation (σg) (Equation [8]). The farmer perceives the levels of risk associated with rainfall and 
gari price by their respective coefficients of variations (θr and θg).
 Equation (4) states that the 
beginning-period non-productive asset level at t + 1 (Wt+1) is the budget balance of t expressed as (2).  
3
We now see how risk-averse farmers facing risks in rainfall or gari price may benefit from being 
able to invest in productive assets such as an irrigation pump and milling machine that can mitigate the 
impact of such risks. We specifically focus on the relationship between farmers’ utility and the changes in 
θr and θg.  
 In our model, due to the limitation in 
data, only the inter-state variation in θr and θg are incorporated, and farmers in the same state are assumed 
to face the same levels of risk. For simplicity, we assume that the irrigation pump makes the farmer 
completely free from rainfall risk, and cassava flour price is fixed so that the milling machine makes a 
farmer completely free from gari price risk. 
Modifying Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993), the expected indirect utility function for a farmer at 
time t (Vt) can be expressed as  
  (10) 
in which the expected operator is taken over the distribution function H(∙) of rainfall and gari price. For 
simplicity, the distributions of rainfall and gari price are assumed independent of each other.  
For a risk-averse farmer, we expect to have  and  , meaning that the 
indirect utility function V is concave in rainfall and gari price. Then, under the Fadama II project, we 
have 
0
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in which E[Vt |Pt = 0, F=1] is the expected utility at time t of a farmer who is a Fadama II beneficiary but 
does not invest in irrigation pump, measured by expression (10), while E[Vt |Mt = 0, F=1] is for a Fadama 
II beneficiary not investing in milling machine. Condition (11) says that in the absence of an irrigation 
pump a higher risk in rainfall lowers the farmer’s expected utility, and in the absence of a milling 
machine a higher risk in gari price lowers the farmer’s expected utility. On the other hand, we have 
                                                       
2 The Fadama membership subsidy rates remain unchanged after t = 1, and therefore the subscript t is dropped. 
3 The distribution of gari price and rainfall are assumed constant over time t. 
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(12) 
meaning that, with an irrigation pump and a milling machine, the farmer’s expected utility is unaffected 
by the increase in corresponding risks.  
Conditions (11) and (12) together indicate 
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(14) 
which say that the increase in expected utility from an investment in an irrigation pump and a milling 
machine is greater when rainfall risk and gari price risk are higher.  
Under Fadama II, farmers’ reservation benefit is from investment in other productive assets n, 
E[Vt(∙|F = 1) | Nt = 1] − E[Vt(∙|F = 1) | Nt = 0)]. Assuming that other productive assets do not mitigate the 
effect of rainfall risk and gari price risk, we have  
{ }
0
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(16) 
Since only a fixed amount of financial assistance f* can be received for the investment in 
productive assets, farmers under the Fadama II program invest in an irrigation pump before investing 
other productive assets if  
E[Vt  | Pt = 1, F = 1] − E[Vt  | Pt = 0, F = 1] > 
E[Vt  | Nt = 1, F = 1]  − E[Vt  | Nt = 0, F = 1]  (17) 
and invest in a milling machine rather than other productive assets if  
E[Vt  | Mt = 1, F = 1] − E[Vt  | Mt = 0, F = 1] > 
E[Vt  | Nt = 1, F = 1]  − E[Vt  | Nt = 0, F = 1].  (18) 
Conditions (14) through (17) lead to the following expressions:  
∂{Probability[(17) is true]} / ∂θr > 0,  or 
 
(19)  [ ]
0







∂{Probability[(18) is true]} / ∂θg > 0,  or 
.  (20) 
A higher risk in rainfall leads to a higher probability of farmers’ investing in an irrigation pump 
and a higher risk in gari price leads to a higher probability of farmers’ investing in a milling machine. The 
two hypotheses tested in this study are that 
Hypothesis 1: The change of likelihood of a farmer’s investing in an irrigation pump following a 
capital injection like that of Fadama II is more positive in an environment with higher rainfall 
risks. 
(21) 
Hypothesis 2: The change of likelihood of a farmer’s investing in a milling machine following a 
capital injection like that of Fadama II is more positive in an environment with higher risks to 
the price of gari (cassava processed without using a milling machine). 
(22) 
Hypothesis 1 is tested empirically by testing whether condition (19) holds, and similarly 
condition (20) for hypothesis 2. Hypotheses 1 and 2 may not hold if (a) farmers are not averse to the gari 
price risk and rainfall risk because they have other means to insure themselves, (b) farmers are not risk-
averse at all, or (c) Fadama financial assistance is large enough so that farmers can invest in many 
productive assets. Whether conditions (19) or (20) hold or not is important in understanding farmers’ 
capability of insuring themselves against market and rainfall uncertainty, which are tested through the 











3.  EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
Our empirical models regress farmers’ decisions on investment in irrigation pumps and milling machines 
on Fadama II membership status, level of rainfall risk, and level of gari price risk. The estimation method 
exploits the panel structure of the dataset. More specifically, the general specification of our model is the 
following. For each farmer (subscript dropped),  
 ,  (23) 
in which yt {Pt, Mt} is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the farmer invests in productive assets 
(irrigation pump, milling machine) in t = 2006, 0 otherwise, and is determined by function f. Et 
is a 
dummy variable that equals 1 if a farmer belongs to the local government area in which farmers are 
eligible to participate in the Fadama II program (called Fadama II LGA hereafter), and Ft is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if a farmer actually participates in the Fadama II program. Therefore (Et, Ft) = (1, 1) 
for a Fadama II member, (Et, Ft) = (1, 0) for non-member of Fadama II in a Fadama II LGA (called 
Fadama II neighbor hereafter), and (Et, Ft) = (0, 0) for other farmers. The symbol ∆ denotes the first 
difference, so that ∆yt = yt – yt-1 and similarly for ∆Ft and ∆Et. Since the Fadama II project started in 2006, 
Ft-1 = Et-1 = 0, and thus ∆Ft = Ft
 and ∆Et = Et. Variable ∆Et is used to control for the effects arising from 
various components of the Fadama II program, which has significant externality, such as road 
construction. Other variables include a state dummy (Ψ); risk variables θr and θg; and key characteristics 
of respondents, such as gender and education (Γ). It must be noted that equation (23) does not include the 
average return from investment. The average return is assumed relatively similar among farmers, or less 
heterogeneous compared to the risks, and can be omitted from (23). This assumption is required partly 
due to the lack of data on investment return.  
Equation (23) expresses both the irrigation pump equation (∆Pt as the dependent variable) and the 
milling machine equation (∆Mt as the dependent variable). The irrigation pump equation and the milling 
machine equation are estimated separately instead of jointly, and θr only appears in the irrigation pump 
equation while θg only appears in the milling machine equation.  
Estimation of (23) needs to account for the potential endogeneity problem behind ∆Ft because 
both Fadama II participation decisions and investment decisions can be affected by common factors, 
although Fadama II eligibility (∆Et) is exogenous because the Fadama II LGA was selected by the 
government. This study employs two estimation approaches: (1) LPM with 2SLS specification and (2) 
stratified PSM. 
In the first estimation, LPM is used instead of discrete models such as probit or logit although the 
dependent variable in equation (23) is binary, because the estimation of the discrete model becomes 
complicated if endogenous discrete variables are included while LPM with 2SLS specification can 
provide consistent estimates  (Angrst, 2000). Our LPM specification is expressed as  
,
  (24) 
in which ∆Ft and ∆Et are interacted with time-invariant variables θr, θg, Ψ, and Γ. All variables containing 
∆Ft are instrumented by instrumental variables (IVs). The excluded IVs in this case include characteristics 
of respondents (age, education) and household size interacted with ∆Et, θr, and θg.  
( ) Γ ∆ ∆ = ∆ , Ψ , , , , g r t t t F E f y θ θ
∈
( ) ( ) t t t t t g t r t t E E E F F F y ε γ θ θ β α + Γ × ∆ Ψ × ∆ ∆ ∆ ⋅ + × ∆ × ∆ ⋅ + = ∆ , , , ,8 
In the second method, the stratified PSM extends the standard PSM by using strata based on the 
level of gari price risk and rainfall risk as additional information for matching the sample, as combining 
the matching based on covariates and propensity score can significantly reduce the bias (Dehejia and 
Wahba 1999; Stuart and Rubin 2008). The estimation of stratified PSM proceeds in the following way. 
First, the observations are stratified into two or three groups j based on the levels of gari price and rainfall 
risks. Second, within each stratum, standard PSM is conducted on the Fadama II membership status, 
which gives us the average treatment effect (ATE) for stratum j of Fadama II membership on farmers’ 
investment in productive assets. The estimated ATEj are then compared across groups to test the 
hypotheses that the ATEj becomes significantly higher as the target population moves to the stratum with 
higher risks, which is equivalent to hypotheses (21) and (22). 
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4.  DATA 
Descriptive Statistics in Fadama II and Preliminary Assessment of the Hypotheses 
This study uses the dataset collected for the evaluation of Fadama II (Fadama II dataset). A detailed 
description of the data collection framework for the Fadama II dataset is provided in Nkonya et al. (2008). 
The key descriptive statistics from Fadama II dataset are summarized in Tables 1 and 2. In 2006, 86 
producers among 1,281 Fadama II members invested in milling machines while only 5 out of 1,224 
Fadama II neighbors and 29 out of 1,253 remaining farmers invested in milling machines (Table 1). 
Similarly, 212 producers among 1,281 Fadama II members invested in irrigation pumps, while 19 out of 
1,224 Fadama II neighbors and 30 out of 1,253 remaining farmers invested in irrigation pumps.  
Table 1. Investment in irrigation pumps and milling machines under Fadama II by investor 
characteristics 
  Total 
observations 
Milling machine  Irrigation pump 
Total  Personal  Group  Total  Personal  Group 
Total  3758  120  37  83  261  170  91 
Fadama II member  1281  86  23  63  212  126  86 
Fadama II neighbor  1224  5  3  2  19  15  4 
Non-Fadama II LGA  1253  29  11  18  30  29  1 
Male  2629  56  23  33  218  150  68 
Female  1124  57  14  43  43  20  23 
Owner of milling 
machine before 2006  167  9  9  0       
Owner of irrigation 
pump before 2006  257        69  48  21 
Source: Calculated from Fadama II dataset by authors. 
There were slight differences between male and female respondents in investment 
behaviors. While a higher percentage of male farmers (8 percent, or 218 out of 2,629) invested in 
irrigation pumps than did females (4 percent), a higher percentage of female farmers invested in milling 
machines (5 percent, or 57 out of 1,124) than did male farmers (2 percent). Female investors in milling 
machines and irrigation pumps tended to own them in groups while male investors tended to own them 
personally.  
In 2005, approximately 5 percent of farmers in the dataset already owned milling machines, either 
personally or in a group (167 out of 3,758). In 2006, 5 percent (9 of 167) of farmers who already owned a 
milling machine invested in milling machines again, while only 3 percent (120 – 9 = 111 of 3,591) of 
those without milling machines before 2006 newly obtained access to a milling machine. Irrigation pumps 
were already owned by 7 percent (257 out of 3,758) of farmers in 2005. In 2006, 27 percent of those who 
already owned irrigation pumps invested again in irrigation pumps, while only 5 percent (261 – 69 = 192 
out of 3,501) of farmers without irrigation pumps before 2006 newly invested in irrigation pumps. For 
both milling machines and irrigation pumps, those who had previously invested were more likely to 
invest again in 2006, indicating that although those farmers had been aware of the profitability of further 
investment in these assets, they had been unable to invest more due to liquidity constraints. Such a high 
liquidity constraint is observed from the fact that most households in the dataset, including the households 
of farmers who had invested in milling machine or irrigation pump, typically spend less than four hundred 
US dollars per year on overall household expenditure (Table 2) 
To measure the levels of risk, we computed coefficients of variation calculated from historical 
rainfall trends and gari prices, which have been widely used as objective measures of rainfall risks (Gaiha 
and Imai 2004; Quisumbing 1996; Zeller, Diagne, and Mataya 1998) and price risks in the literature. 
Table 3 presents the coefficient of variation of annual rainfall and monthly price of white gari in selected 10 
locations. The price of white gari
4
Table 2. General characteristics of respondentabc 
 was used to represent the market risks facing farmers because of its 
popularity as a processed commodity.  
  All observations   Milling machine 
investor in 2006 
Irrigation pump 
investor in 2006 
median  SD  median  SD  median  SD 
Household size  9  7  9  8  10  7 
Age of respondent  42  12      45  12  45  12 
Female respondent (%)  30    50    16   
Years of education of respondent  6  6  6  6  6  5 
Annual household expenditure in 2005  $239  $35,501  $383  $1,221  $234  $7,349 
Total value of assets in 2005
c  $1,575  $1,900,000  $1,575  $11,417  $2,472  $12,297 
Distance to nearest town in 2005 (km)  4  17  4  7  4   10 
Distance to nearest all-weather road in 
2005 (km) 
3  78  4  24  2  124 
Source: Calculated from Fadama II dataset by authors. 
Note:
 aThe number of observations varies for different variables. 
bAll monetary amounts are in US$ with conversion rate of US$1 = 127 NGN. 
cAsset value includes the value of land owned. 
Table 3. Coefficient of variation for annual rainfall and monthly price of white gari in selected 
locations 
State  Annual rainfall    White gari 
monthly price
b  Reference city  CV  Years covered
a   
Adamawa  Yola  .333   1971–2003    .205 
Bauchi  Bauchi  .166  1971–1996, 1998, 2000–2006    .213 
Gombe  Bauchi  .166  1971–1996, 1998, 2000–2006    .234 
Imo  Owerri  .130  1975–1980, 1982–1986, 1989–1992, 1994–1996, 
1999, 2001, 2004–2006 
  .241 
Kaduna  Kaduna  .120  1971–1979, 1984–2000, 2002, 2004–2006    .257 
Kebbi  Sokoto  .211  1971–1979, 1981–1982, 1985–2006    .240 
FCT  Abuja  .096  1983–2001, 2004, 2006    .260 
Lagos  Ikeja  .158  1975, 1977, 1986, 1987, 1989–1992, 1995, 1996, 
1998, 1999, 2001, 2003–2005 
  .259 
Niger  Minna  .140  1971–1975, 1977–1979, 1983–1987, 1989, 1991, 
1993–1996, 1998–2006 
  .284 
Ogun  Ijebu Ode  .150  1996–2005    .323 
Oyo  Ibadan  .204  1975–2005    .297 
Taraba  Yola  .333  1971–2003    .227 
Source: Calculated by the authors from NIMET (2009) for rainfall data except Adamawa and Taraba, whose numbers are 
extracted from Oyekale (2009), and NBS (2007) for white gari price data.  
Note:
 aYears with periods where data were missing were excluded. The duration of total years also depended on the data 
availability. 
bPeriod of coverage for white gari price is from January 2001 through September 2005.  
   
                                                       
4 Although there are two types of gari, yellow gari and white gari, the movement of their prices is almost identical, so it is 
safe to use white gari prices to obtain the market price risks index in Table 3.  11 
Acquisition of Productive Assets under Fadama II: Key Implications  
The purpose of this study is to assess the link between risks and farmers’ investment in productive assets, 
not to evaluate the Fadama II program. Description of the Fadama II program is therefore minimized in 
this study. Here we provide only the basic picture and components that are relevant to our study. 
Fadama II was one of the World Bank and African Development Bank assisted agricultural 
development programs aimed at addressing productivity growth constraints in Nigeria. Fadama II 
operated on the concept of community-driven development. Pilot asset acquisition is one of the key 
components of Fadama II, and it provides assistance for the purchase of moderately priced productive 
assets, such as irrigation pumps and milling machines.  
The process of obtaining productive assets under Fadama II starts when farmers decide to 
participate in the Fadama User Group, based only on their readiness to contribute their own funds as 
required for various activities agreed upon by the members and carried out by the group, including the 
purchase of productive assets at subsidized costs. Once all members of the group agree to obtain 
particular productive assets, the members purchase them as a group or individually by receiving a 70% 
subsidy of the price, or up to the equivalent of US$500 for the entire group. Irrigation pumps, for 
example, are purchased through advertisement to prospective suppliers and a bidding process. In 
principle, each farmer in the group can obtain a different type of irrigation pump or milling machine 
based on their needs. The process of acquiring these productive assets can be time-consuming and is 
assumed to vary widely across states and regions.
5
Aside from pump or milling machine acquisition, Fadama II provides various other benefits to 
members, including construction of roads and advisory services on production, processing, storage, and 
marketing. The investment by Fadama II members in irrigation pumps or milling machines therefore also 
affects the other Fadama II neighbors. In our empirical estimation, such neighboring effects are controlled 
for by variable  and various interactions terms.  
  
                                                       
5 The processes for Fadama User Group of preparing development plans or proposals (for example, to purchase irrigation 
pumps) typically takes about 13 to 14 weeks, followed by assessment and screening of proposals by the Fadama II supervising 
bodies.  
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5.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
This section shows the empirical results. We first briefly show the results supporting homogeneous return 
on milling machines. We then show key results on the empirical tests of hypotheses (21) and (22) using 
LPM and stratified PSM. 
We first ran a simple regression to see how homogeneous the average return may be across 
farmers. As was mentioned in section 3, our empirical methods require that, unlike the risks associated 
with rainfall and gari price, the average return from investment in irrigation pumps and milling machines 
will not vary across states. Although not comprehensive, we used the sub-sample of farmers reporting the 
difference in price between processed commodities and raw commodities, which can roughly indicate the 
return for a milling machine. More specifically, 221 reported percentage differences in these two prices 
were regressed on key variables such as Fadama II membership, state, distance to nearest town, and crop 
dummies (Table 4). We found that most of these variables are insignificant or significant only at the 10% 
level, and the return from the processed commodity relative to the raw product price does not seem to 
vary significantly across states nor does it depend on Fadama II membership or distance to the nearest 
town.  
Table 4. Regional variation in percent price difference between processed products and raw 
products
a 
Dependent variable: % difference in prices between 
processed products and raw products 
Coefficient  SE 
Fadama II member  .336  (.258) 
Fadama II eligibility  .027  (.262) 
Distance to nearest town  -.014  (.010) 
Fadama II member × Distance   -.010  (.012) 
Fadama II eligibility × Distance  .021*  (.011) 
State 2  -.594  (.923) 
State 3  -.299  (1.510) 
State 4  .345  (.641) 
State 5  -.209  (1.160) 
State 6  .113  (1.307) 
State 7  .158  (.625) 
State 8  1.463**  (.682) 
State 9  .110  (.547) 
State 10  1.399*  (.722) 
State 11  -1.287*  (.669) 
State 12  .553  (.577) 
Intercept  -3.543*  (1.822) 
Number of observations  221   
Source: Authors. 
Note:
 aDummies for products are dropped.*** Significant at 1%;  ** Significant at 5%;  * Significant at 10%. 
2SLS results (Tables 5 and 6) 
The results of 2SLS regression (24) are presented in Table 5 (for irrigation pumps) and Table 6 (for 
milling machines) together with the ordinary least square (OLS) versions for comparison.
6
                                                       
6 The set of variables for household characteristics used in 2SLS and PSM in this study is different from those used for PSM 
in Nkonya et al. (2008). Nkonya et al. (2008) used area of rainfed land, distance to nearest town and all-weather road, and value 
of productive assets and livestock before the project in addition to the variables of gender, household size, age, and education 
level used in this study. This study, however, dropped the former variables because their inclusion caused various identification 
problems in 2SLS, such as overidentification and underidentification that are reported at the bottoms of Table 5 and Table 6. In 
PSM, this study uses the same set of variables as IVs that are used in 2SLS to maintain consistency.    
 The results of 13 
first stage regressions in 2SLS are presented in Tables 7 and 8. As was discussed in Section 3, since most 
variables are first-differenced, many of the variables measuring characteristics of the farrmer’s household 
are dropped and only appear in interaction terms.  
Table 5. Determinants of farmers’ investment in irrigation pumpsab 
Dependent variable 
(= 1 if invested in 2006, = 0 otherwise) 
OLS  2SLS 
Coefficient  SE
b  Coefficient  SE
b 
Fadama II member  .163***  (.011)  .094*  (.056) 
Fadama II member × rainfall risk  .024  (.127)  1.534**  (.701) 
Eligibility  .017  (.019)  -.058  (.053) 
Eligibility × gender of respondent  -.080***  (.011)  -.072***  (.014) 
Eligibility × State 2  -.051**  (.024)     
Eligibility × State 3  -.074***  (.022)  .053  (.060) 
Eligibility × State 4  -.085***  (.022)  .082  (.076) 
Eligibility × State 5  .080**  (.029)  .227***  (.078) 
Eligibility × State 6  .182***  (.035)  .275***  (.053) 
Eligibility × State 7  -.024  (.025)  .171*  (.089) 
Eligibility × State 8  -.024  (.025)  .109*  (.064) 
Eligibility × State 9  -.079***  (.022)  .069  (.069) 
Eligibility × State 10  .076***  (.029)  .216***  (.069) 
Eligibility × State 11  .027  (.029)  .123**  (.051) 
Eligibility × State 12  -.064**  (.023)  -.069***  (.024) 
Intercept  .024***  (.004)  .022***  (.005) 
R-square  .152  .171  .111   
p-value         
  H0: No overall significance  .000    .000   
  H0: No endogeneity (Hausman)      .052   
  H0: Not overidentified      .281   
  H0: Underidentified      .000   
Number of observations  3,740    3,182   
Source: Authors. 
Note:
 aWhen the education variable is included as external IV, the number of observations drops to 3,182. In the OLS, we present 
the results using all 3,740 observations.
 
bNumbers in parentheses are estimated standard errors.  
*** Significant at 1%; ** Significant at 5%;  * Significant at 10%. 
In Table 5, variables including Fadama II membership were found endogenous to the decisions 
on irrigation pump investment based on the Hausman test
7
The results for milling machines in Table 6 are more nuanced. Unlike the case for irrigation 
pumps, there was less clear evidence that variables including Fadama II membership were endogenous to 
the decisions on milling machine investment (Hausman test). Results from both OLS and 2SLS need to be 
interpreted.  
. The results of 2SLS estimates in Table 5 
indicate that farmers who were Fadama II members were more likely to invest in irrigation pumps, and 
this impact of Fadama II membership was higher when farmers were facing higher rainfall risk. The 
positive effect of rainfall risk on farmers’ investment in irrigation pumps therefore supports our 
hypothesis (21) that farmers invest in an irrigation pump in order partly to mitigate the effects of rainfall 
risk. A significant effect of rainfall risk on irrigation pump investment indicates that farmers in the dataset 
lack the resources to mitigate the rainfall risk and lack the access to effective agricultural insurance 
services. 
   
                                                       
7 We used the regression-based form of the Hausman test (Wooldridge, 2002, p.118) which is asymptotically equivalent to 
the original form of the Hausman test proposed by Hausman (1978). 14 
Table 6. Determinants of farmers’ investment in milling machinesab 
Dependent variable  
(= 1 if invested in 2006, = 0 otherwise) 
OLS  2SLS 
Coefficient  SE
b  Coefficient  SE
b 
Fadama II member  .062***  (.007)  .071  (.054) 
Fadama II member × price risk of gari  .620**  (.261)  -.146  (1.654) 
Eligibility  -.010  (.009)  -.034  (.054) 
Eligibility × gender of respondent  .028***  (.010)  .027  (.018) 
Eligibility × education of respondent (10 years)  -.013*  (.007)  -.012  (.011) 
Eligibility × State 3  .027  (.018)  .038  (.025) 
Eligibility × State 4  .001  (.015)  .013  (.028) 
Eligibility × State 5  .003  (.017)  .023  (.045) 
Eligibility × State 6  -.027  (.008)  -.013  (.028) 
Eligibility × State 7  .114***  (.029)  .135**  (.055) 
Eligibility × State 8  -.022*  (.012)  -.001  (.044) 
Eligibility × State 9  -.043***  (.012)  -.012  (.064) 
Eligibility × State 10  .003  (.012)  .048  (.091) 
Eligibility × State 11  .013  (.015)  .049  (.081) 
Eligibility × State 12  .019  (.016)  .029  (.051) 
Intercept  .010***  (.003)  .010***  (.003) 
R-square  .074    .069   
p-value         
  H0: not overidentified      .648   
  H0: underidentified       .088   
  Overall significance  .000    .000   
  H0: No endogeneity (Hausman test)  .914       
Number of observations    3,182    3,182   
Source: Authors. 
Note:
 aPrice risk is the coefficient of variation for white gari. 
bNumbers in parentheses are estimated standard errors. 
*** Significant at 1%; ** Significant at 5%;  * Significant at 10% 
The effect of gari price risk on Fadama II member farmers’ investment in milling machines was 
found significantly positive in the OLS but insignificant in the 2SLS due to inflated standard errors. 
Although the findings are not as conclusive as the case for irrigation pumps, the results for milling 
machines still provide indication supporting the hypothesis (22). With the availability of external capital 
injection such as Fadama II, farmers facing higher gari price risk are more likely to invest in milling 
machines, which make it possible to process cassava into flour instead of gari.  
The discussion of results on other variables (eligibility for Fadama II, gender, education, and 
state) are secondary in this paper, and only key findings are pointed out. The effects of Fadama II 
eligibility seem to vary from state to state, as do the effects of some characteristics of farmers, such as 
gender and education. Female farmers who live in the Fadama II LGA, for example, are less likely than 
males to invest in irrigation pumps, while they are actually more likely to invest in milling machines.  
Table 7. First-stage regression for irrigation pump equation 
Dependent variable 
 
Fadama II member  Fadama II member × 
rainfall risk 
Coefficient  Robust 
SE 
Coefficient  Robust 
SE 
Excluded instruments         
  Eligibility × household size  .010***  (.001)  .000  (.000) 
  Eligibility × age of respondent  .003***  (.001)  .000  (.000) 
  Eligibility × education of respondent  .006***  (.002)  -.0002*  (.000) 
  Eligibility × household size × rainfall risk  .000  (.014)  .011***  (.001) 
  Eligibility × age × rainfall risk  .013  (.010)  .003***  (.001) 15 
Table 7. Continued 
Dependent variable 
 
Fadama II member  Fadama II member × 
rainfall risk 
Coefficient  Robust 
SE 
Coefficient  Robust 
SE 
  Eligibility × education × rainfall risk  -.056***  (.021)  -.000  (.001) 
Included instruments         
  Eligibility  .146*  (.083)  .036***  (.007) 
  Eligibility × State 3  .030  (.089)  -.045***  (.007) 
  Eligibility × State 4  .088  (.110)  -.060***  (.009) 
  Eligibility × State 5  .017  (.110)  -.055***  (.009) 
  Eligibility × State 6  .028  (.071)  -.034***  (.006) 
  Eligibility × State 7  .095  (.117)  -.072***  (.009) 
  Eligibility × State 8  .014  (.095)  -.048***  (.008) 
  Eligibility × State 9  .049  (.098)  -.052***  (.008) 
  Eligibility × State 10  .046  (.096)  -.051***  (.008) 
  Eligibility × State 11  .007  (.073)  -.036***  (.006) 
  Eligibility × State 12  -.044  (.039)  -.005*  (.003) 
  Eligibility × gender  .163***  (.019)  .003*  (.001) 
Intercept  .000  (.013)  .000  (.001) 
R-square  .296    .524   
Number of observations  3,182    3,182   
Source: Authors. 
Note:
 *** Significant at 1%; ** Significant at 5%; * Significant at 10%. 
Table 8. First-stage regression for milling machine equation 
Dependent variable 
 
Fadama II member  Fadama II member × 
gari price risk 
Coefficient  Robust 
SE 
Coefficient  Robust 
SE 
Excluded instruments         
  Eligibility × household size  .010***  (.001)  -.000  (.000) 
  Eligibility × age of respondent  .003***  (.001)  .000***  (.000) 
  Eligibility × education of respondent  .005***  (.002)  .000***  (.000) 
  Eligibility × household size × price risk  -.012  (.038)  .008***  (.001) 
  Eligibility × age × price risk  .075***  (.024)  .005***  (.001) 
  Eligibility × education × price risk  .226***  (.054)  .006***  (.002) 
Included instruments         
  Eligibility  .404***  (.078)  -.012***  (.003) 
  Eligibility × State 3  -.133**  (.054)  .004**  (.002) 
  Eligibility × State 4  -.090  (.056)  .004*  (.002) 
  Eligibility × State 5  -.255***  (.076)  .008**  (.003) 
  Eligibility × State 6  -.160***  (.058)  .006***  (.002) 
  Eligibility × State 7  -.177**  (.078)  .009***  (.003) 
  Eligibility × State 8  -.270***  (.076)  .007***  (.003) 
  Eligibility × State 9  -.333***  (.098)  .013***  (.003) 
  Eligibility × State 10  -.525***  (.144)  .018***  (.005) 
  Eligibility × State 11  -.447***  (.118)  .013***  (.004) 
  Eligibility × State 12  -.164***  (.049)  .004**  (.002) 
  Eligibility × gender  .162***  (.019)  .002**  (.001) 
Intercept  .000  (.013)  .000  (.001) 
R-square  .298    .521   
Number of observations  3,182    3,182   
Source: Authors. 
Note:
 *** Significant at 1%;  ** Significant at 5%;  * Significant at 10%. 
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Propensity Score Matching  
Tables 9 through 12 report the results from stratified PSM. Tables 11 and 12 report impacts of Fadama II 
membership on farmers’ investment in irrigation pumps and milling machines. For irrigation pump 
investment, based on the rainfall risk level in Table 3, the four states with the highest rainfall risks 
(Adamawa, Taraba, Kebbi, and Oyo) were grouped as high risk group, the four states with the lowest 
rainfall risks (Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Kaduna, Imo, and Niger) were grouped as lower risk 
group, and the remaining four states were grouped as medium risk group. Probit regressions were run 
within each group to obtain the propensity scores of farmers for Fadama II participation (Table 9). After 
the propensity scores were estimated, we drop observations in treatment group (Fadama II member) 
whose propensity score was higher than the maximum or less than the minimum propensity score of the 
control groups. Consequently, 840 out of 846 observations in the high rainfall risk group, 589 out of 596 
in the medium rainfall risk group, and 702 out of 719 in the low rainfall risk group are matched 
respectively (at the bottom of Table 9). The impact of Fadama II membership on farmers’ investment in 
irrigation pumps was then estimated as the ATE on treated for each of the three groups.
8 A similar 
approach was taken for milling machines, with Table 10 showing the results of first-stage probit 
regression for the milling machine equation and the number of matched observations in each group. It is 
important to note that, for both the irrigation pump and the milling machine equation, different propensity 
scores are obtained for the same farmer. These differences are due to the difference in grouping for 
irrigation pump and for milling machine.
9




 *** Significant at 1%; ** Significant at 5%; * Significant at 10%. 
                                                       
8 This estimation was done by the STATA program “PSMATCH2”, developed by Leuven and Sianesi (2003).  
9 The difference is also due to the fact that interaction terms for gari price risk are excluded from the irrigation pump 
equation and interaction terms for rainfall risk are excluded from the milling machine equation. We tested whether including 
these terms would affect the results and found no significant changes in the results in Table 11 and Table 12. 
Dependent variable 
= 1 if Fadama II member, 
= 0 otherwise 
High risk  Medium risk  Low risk 
Coefficient  SE  Coefficient  SE  Coefficient  SE 
Excluded instruments             
  Eligibility × household size  .029*  (.016)  .018  (.042)  .111***  (.034) 
  Eligibility × age of respondent  .018**  (.007)  -.039  (.029)  .003  (.021) 
  Eligibility × education of respondent  .040***  (.015)  -.168***  (.055)  .076*  (.046) 
  Eligibility × gender  .693***  (.165)  .476  (.577)  .975**  (.458) 
  Eligibility × household size × rainfall risk  .026  (.130)  .019  (1.349)  1.091**  (.512) 
  Eligibility × age × rainfall risk  -.049  (.067)  -1.444  (.885)  .027  (.317) 
  Eligibility × education × rainfall risk  -.330**  (.131)  -5.829***  (1.863)  .711  (.702) 
  Eligibility × gender × rainfall risk  -1.843  (1.522)  .986  (18.111)  9.721  (6.717) 
  Eligibility × State 3      1.504**  (.630)     
  Eligibility × State 4          .335*  (.200) 
  Eligibility × State 5          .257  (.314) 
  Eligibility × State 6  -.502  (.413)         
  Eligibility × State 7          .973  (.622) 
  Eligibility × State 8      .616*  (.330)     
  Eligibility × State 11  -.686  (.457)         
  Eligibility × State 12  -.131  (.126)         
Intercept  -.860***  (.286)  -1.353***  (.421)  -1.060***  (.300) 
Overall significance (p-value)  .000    .001    .000   
Number of observations  846  596    719   
Matched observations based on estimated 
propensity score  840  589    702   17 
Table 10. First-stage probit for PSM (by gari price risks) 
Source: Authors. 
Note:
 *** Significant at 1%; ** Significant at 5%;  * Significant at 10%. 
The results in Table 11 indicate that the effect of Fadama II membership on irrigation pump 
investment increases monotonically as the rainfall risk increases. For example, in the high rainfall risk 
group, the Fadama II program on average increased the likelihood of farmers’ investing in irrigation 
pumps by 22.2 percentage points, whereas the increase was 11.9 percentage points and 7.2 percentage 
points for medium and low rainfall risk groups. The results from the PSM are consistent with the results 
from Table 5, supporting the hypothesis that higher rainfall risks make farmers more likely to invest in 
irrigation pumps when their liquidity constraint is relaxed.  
Table 11. Average treatment effect (ATE) on treated based on propensity score matching by the 
level of rainfall risk 
  High rainfall risk   Medium rainfall risk  Low rainfall risk 
Estimated ATE on treated  .222  .119  .072 
Standard error  (.024)  (.027)  (.020) 
Source: Authors. 
On the contrary, the results from PSM on milling machine investment are ambiguous (Table 12). 
The impacts of Fadama II membership on the likelihood of milling machine investment seem to be 
significantly positive at all levels of gari price risk, but vary at different levels of risk in a non-monotonic 
way. While the Fadama II program raised the likelihood of milling machine investment by 11.6 
percentage points in the high gari price risk group, it did so by only 3.0 percentage points in the medium 
gari price risk group, which is lower than the 6.6 percentage points found in the low risk group. The 
difference in the impacts, however, becomes clearer when only two levels of risk are considered. The 
Dependent variable 
= 1 if Fadama II member 
= 0 otherwise 
High risk  Medium risk  Low risk 
Coefficient  SE  Coefficient  SE  Coefficient  SE 
Excluded instruments             
  Eligibility × household size  .041**  (.017)  .033***  (.010)  .032  (.021) 
  Eligibility × age of respondent  -.004  (.010)  .003  (.005)  .015  (.014) 
  Eligibility × education of respondent  .022  (.024)  .022**  (.010)  -.006  (.023) 
  Eligibility × gender  .265  (.218)  .396***  (.116)  .382  (.293) 
  Eligibility × household size × price risk  -.165  (.406)  -.073  (1.078)  .153  (.720) 
  Eligibility × age × price risk  .464**  (.219)  .406  (.484)  .234  (.430) 
  Eligibility × education × price risk  .430  (.555)  -.834  (1.066)  .285  (.711) 
  Eligibility × gender × price risk  5.938  (4.621)  6.974  (11.64)  -.862  (9.007) 
  Eligibility × State 3          -.342  (.543) 
  Eligibility × State 4      .448  (.456)     
  Eligibility × State 6      .328  (.425)     
  Eligibility × State 7  1.582**  (.690)         
  Eligibility × State 8      .009  (.180)     
  Eligibility × State 9  .980**  (.459)         
  Eligibility × State 11  .536*  (.319)         
  Eligibility × State 12          -.433  (.434) 
Intercept  -2.106***  (.427)  -.848***  (.305)  -.421  (.396) 
Overall significance (p-value)  .000    .000    .000   
Number of observations  742  768    651   
Matched observations based on estimated 
propensity score  708  764    645   18 
higher risk group exhibits an 8.3 percentage point increase in likelihood of investing in a milling machine, 
while the increase is 5.0 percentage points in the lower risk group. Assuming these estimated percentage 
points are uncorrelated with each other, their difference is significant at the 10% level.
10
Table 12. Average treatment effect (ATE) on treated based on propensity score matching by the 
level of gari price risk
a 
 The results thus 
provide somewhat weak evidence regarding the hypothesis that higher gari price risks lead to more 
investment in milling machines when liquidity constraint is relaxed, but they still point toward the 
importance of understanding how market risks play important roles in farmers’ decisions on investment in 
productive assets.  
  Three strata 
  High gari price risk   Medium gari price risk  Low gari price risk 
Estimated ATE on treated  .116  .030  .066 
Standard error  (.019)  (.009)  (.016) 
  Two strata 
  Higher gari price risk     Lower gari price risk 
Estimated ATE on treated  .083    .050 
Standard error  (.014)    (.010) 
Source: Authors. 
Note:
 aIn two strata cases, 1,043 out of 1,081 observations in high gari price risk group and 1,076 out of 1,080 observations in 
low gari price risk group were matched respectively and used for the estimation of ATE on treated. 
   
                                                       




≈ .017.  19 
6.  CONCLUSION 
Productive assets play dual roles in risk-prone agriculture in developing countries, improving productivity 
as well as insuring against risks. Our study shows two examples. Irrigation assets, which principally 
increase agricultural productivity, shield farmers from exposure to rainfall risk by securing water supply 
under erratic weather conditions. Milling machines, likewise, not only increase the market value of 
produce through processing but also protect farmers from exposure to the price risks of unprocessed 
crops. Our empirical evidence showed that once liquidity constraint was relaxed through the Fadama II 
policy intervention, farmers’ preferences in making investment choices were consistent with the riskiness 
of the environment in which they lived.  
In the above sense, the impacts of Fadama II on irrigation pump and milling machine investments 
are heterogeneous across farmers because the impacts depend on the level of price and rainfall risks the 
farmers face. Farmers facing higher risks of gari price fluctuation are more willing to invest in milling 
machines, which allow them to process cassava into flour. Similarly, in the areas with greater rainfall 
risks, farmers more often used Fadama II funding to acquire irrigation pumps, thereby reducing their 
exposure to rainfall risks.  
When assessing the impacts of a policy intervention that relaxes farmers’ liquidity constraint, it is 
important to take into account the dual role of their productive asset investments. Farmers often aim to 
improve agricultural productivity as well as reduce their exposure to risks by investing in one asset. In 
some cases, it is possible that an investment with a lower level of productivity looks inefficient but the 
inefficiency could be compensated by a reduction of the risks the farmers face. Our examples from 
Nigeria show that the latter effect can be the main motivation of their investment behavior.  20 
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